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The federal government faces a monumental task of protecting national security 
information, advanced warfighting capabilities and the personal information entrusted by 
hundreds of millions of American citizens. Each federal agency has now identified “High 
Value Assets” (HVA) as defined by information sets that our adversaries most typically 
target. The Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation (CDM) initiative aims to establish a 
unified security posture across the federal space with a specific focus on HVAs.   
This work examines federal cybersecurity initiatives and proposes how data 
reputation and telemetry can enhance the federal security posture, increase the costs of 
computer network attack (CNA) of our adversaries, and improve the ability of defenders 
to drive down the time between when malicious code is observed and when protections 
are put in place. 
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Network defenders have a monumental task when it comes to protecting the 
information maintained and used to power the world around us. Cybercriminals 
seemingly pillage unabated through network after network, leaving mayhem and 
destruction in their wake. Companies are learning that the true cost of cyber security goes 
far beyond the price of tools and experts. Neglecting information security can result in 
the loss of market share, customers and reputation, making it impossible to compete in 
the global economy. Companies and governments must continually work to turn the table 
on cybercriminals or risk severe consequences. With security of cyberspace leaning 
significantly toward the offenders, what can be done to improve defenses, detection and 
response?  How do we lower costs of cyber security while raising the cost of computer 
network attacks? How can detected attacks on one party lead to an improved security 
posture for another?   
As cybersecurity costs continue to rise, companies are forced to find creative 
ways to increase coverage, visibility, detection and protection while minimizing the 
associated expense. One field showing promise in achieving these seemingly contrasting 
motives is security intelligence technologies. According to the Ponemon Institute’s 2015 
global report on the cost of cyber crime, companies deploying security intelligence 
technologies realize a 23% return on investment when compared to companies not using 
these tools. This represented the highest ROI out of seven categories of security-enabling 
technologies. Examples of security intelligence technologies include security information 
and event management (SIEM), big data analytics, next-generation firewalls and 
reputation-based services. 
Security intelligence technologies are playing a key role in the evolution and 
maturation of the security programs in the private sector. Next generation firewalls are 
able to dynamically block malicious IP addresses using a continually updated data source 
in the cloud. Malicious documents received by someone in the U.K. can be blocked based 
on a data reputation score established minutes before by hosts in the U.S. Real-time 
“whois” information can be used to protect email services against suspicious domain 
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names that recently stood up. Attackers executing malicious actions against a target may 
inadvertently raise the defenses of other potential targets benefitting from security 
intelligence technologies. A robust security intelligence program can turn the tables on 
attackers and begin to shift the cyber landscape from an offensive advantage to a level 
battlefield. Security intelligence capabilities, when combined with information sharing, 
can reduce exposure to emerging threats by focusing on the time period between when a 
threat is observed until a detection signature is developed and deployed. Creative and 
resourced malware developers continue to outpace signature-based defensive measures. 
Software companies mature in the endpoint protection (EPP) market have struggled to 
keep up with the continually evolving malware landscape. Closing the gap between 
evolving malware and signature-based technologies is a major challenge for EPP 
companies. Security intelligence offers numerous capabilities to reduce the exposure. The 
data reputation element of the security intelligence area strives to fill this gap by 
scrutinizing the originator’s reputation through a crowdsourced methodology. This thesis 
will explore current commercial data reputation models and propose a federated data 
reputation solution leveraging telemetric data aggregation. 
A. DATA REPUTATION SYSTEMS 
Establishing trust is a critical and difficult endeavor in the dynamic and unruly 
cyber domain. Trust management can be implemented by strong policy-based methods, 
such as that achieved through a public key infrastructure (PKI) approach. Unlike policy-
based trust management, reputation-based systems rely on distributed, self-certified 
information (Bonatti, Duma, Olmedilla, & Shahmehri, 2005).  
MacMillan Dictionary (2016) defines reputation as the opinion that people have 
about how good or how bad someone or something is. The concept of reputation is an 
integral social factor that influences countless individual decisions. Business also 
recognizes how critical reputation can be to the success of their bottom line. Online 
services have incorporated reputation tools into their transaction to instill trust and protect 
against cyber threats. 
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Data reputation systems assign reputation scores to digital objects such as IP 
addresses, URLs, email addresses and attachments, and software and data files. These 
scores reflect the extent to which an object is associated with cyber threats and are based 
on security events and observations. They can be discrete values, such as 0, 1, and 2 for 
low, medium, and high reputation or continuous values, say between 0 and 1. The scores 
may be assembled in real time using telemetry data from numerous data sources, 
including sensors placed on networks and hosts, as well as from services that collect data 
such as the IP addresses and domains of malicious sites or the signatures of malicious 
code. Reputation scores are then used by security monitors to determine whether to 
allow, block or send an alert about an action such as accessing a website, opening an 
email attachment or running code. 
The state of reputation for an object can remain in constant fluctuation based on 
temporal aggregation of observed events. The speed and dynamic nature of cyberspace 
and cyber threats requires a data reputation system that can adjust reputation scores in 
real time with a high degree of confidence. There are several factors required to achieve 
the speed and confidence needed for an effective data reputation system. Real time 
reputation scores incorporate numerous data points on a continuous basis and adjust 
accordingly in a risk range. Legitimate hosts suffering a malware infection will have their 
reputation score adjusted from low risk to high risk immediately based on observed 
malicious characteristics. When the infection is cleaned and the host returns to an 
expected baseline of behavior, the reputation score will climb into a neutral or positive 
range based on risk calculation algorithms (Barnett, 2010). Confidence is improved as the 
volume of telemetry data increases. More expansive and diverse input data sources result 
in a higher level of confidence that the reputation score accurately reflects behavior 
observed. Currency of data points is an important consideration that directly affects 
confidence in a data reputation system. Weighing recently observed data over aged 
observations ensure a reputation score that is reflective of the current state of a host. Data 
reputation systems also include specific mechanisms to authenticate the information 
received to ensure it originated from a valid source. The ability to correlate information 
received from all relevant sources is a strength of data reputation systems and is critical 
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to maintaining high confidence in the reputation score. Data reputation systems provide 
insight into the gray space between absolute good and absolute bad (Barnett, 2010). Trust 
is established and maintained through direct observation of numerous data points from 
vast and diverse sources allowing organizations to base policy decision on reputation 
scores to dynamically protect against emerging and evolving threats. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
From a cybersecurity perspective, 2014 can be classified as the year of massive 
data theft and destruction. The year culminated in what experts called the most 
destructive cyber attack reported to date against a company on U.S. soil (Grover, 
Hosenball, & Finkle, 2014). This statement referring to the unprecedented, well-planned 
cyber attack carried out by an organized group believed to be backed by the government 
of North Korean against Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) (Krebs, 2014a) that involved 
the theft of countless documents and emails as well as the destruction of data on 75% of 
company computers (Cieply & Barnes, 2014). Not only did the attack disrupt SPE 
business by causing the company weeks of recovery activities, but the attackers also 
caused damage to the company’s reputation by releasing embarrassing emails, payroll 
information and sensitive personally identifiable information about employees. The 
attackers also tried to hurt SPE’s bottom line by stealing and releasing upcoming movies. 
The attackers then took things to a new level when they threatened terrorist actions 
against movie theaters and movie goers. Never before has our government and economy 
dealt with an attack of this magnitude and purpose. 
Other attacks occurring in 2014 follow a more familiar pattern where data theft is 
motivated by financial gain with retailers being the most targeted sector. Leading in this 
category was Ebay, which suffered an attack resulting in the loss of more than 233 
million user records containing usernames, passwords, phone numbers and physical 
addresses (McGregor, 2014). Ebay assured customers that no financial information was 
stolen, but with the increased risk of identity theft, the loss of confidence is undeniable. 
Target also suffered a devastating cyber attack compromising personal information of 
over 70 million shoppers including financial information of 40 million customers (Krebs, 
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2014b). The financial information quickly found its way onto the black market, resulting 
in over $50 million in profit for the attackers. This attack ended up costing Target $148 
million and financial institutions $200 million (Hardekopf, 2014).  
The Target attack shows just how devastating and costly an intrusion can be and 
should cause companies to reconsider their cybersecurity budget. While increased 
emphasis on cybersecurity could have prevented the Target attack, it was not enough to 
prevent one of the largest cyber attacks against the financial sector. With an annual 
cybersecurity budget of around $250 million, J.P. Morgan is known as a premier banking 
institution. This budget, however, did not change the fact that the company networks 
were targeted, compromised and infiltrated (Goldstein, Perlroth, & Corkery, 2014). For 
two months, cyber criminals were busily collecting account information for over 80 
million households and businesses. Although the data did not include social security 
numbers or account numbers, it is easy to see how the specific information can be used in 
other directed attacks, like spear phishing. 
The tempo of cyber-attacks was sustained in 2015 with a noticeable shift toward 
bulk personally identifiable information (PII) and personal health information (PHI). Of 
note is the high profile Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach that affected over 
20 million government employees, contractors and family members (Nakashima, 2015). 
Included in the heist were the background investigations conducted on employees 
holding positions of national security. The success of our adversaries in cyberspace has 
resulted in the accumulation of personal, private, financial, historical, sensitive, travel and 
other associative information for nearly every government employee (Riley & Robertson, 
2015). Combined with personal health information, such as that lost in the healthcare 
breaches, this allows our adversary to target individuals in a very customized and surgical 
manner without the need to reconnoiter a potential victim (Riley & Walcott, 2015).  
The federal government’s responsibility in protecting the massive troves of 
sensitive information has never been more urgent. Federal- and state-based entitlement 
programs collect and maintain PII and PHI for a majority of American citizens. The 
Social Security Administration (SSA), for example, maintains sensitive wage and 
earnings information on every American from birth and continually updates the data set 
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throughout their lives (Social Security Administration, 2007). The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid (CMS) administers health care programs that benefit over 100 million 
Americans, including children, adults and seniors (The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015). CMS also facilitates payments to health care providers in the 
amount of nearly 1 trillion dollars annually (Health and Human Services, 2015). There 
are numerous examples of sensitive information collected and maintained by the federal 
government requiring sophisticated cybersecurity strategies to ensure the protection and 
assurance from abuse. 
The federal government has initiated several projects and programs to achieve an 
appropriate level of information security. The Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation 
(CDM) initiative is one such program designed to achieve fundamental capabilities 
across several core aspects of cybersecurity in civilian departments and agencies with an 
ability to extend these capabilities to smaller agencies as well as to state and local 
governments  The CDM program also enables the federal government to leverage the 
innovation of the private sector and buy the newest and most effective technologies to 
protect the departments and agencies (Department of Homeland Security, 2015b). 
Another initiative ordered by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) created as a result of the major breach suffered by the OPM is the Cybersecurity 
Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) that came out of the 30 day cybersecurity 
sprints and focused on key components of cybersecurity to address current threats posed 
by host nation actors (Donovan, 2015). Congress has also weighed in by passing the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015 (Congress of the United States, 
2015). CISA turns many of the cybersecurity initiatives into law. One capability missing 
from the current federal strategy is a data reputation repository and service. The ability to 
associate malicious files, emails or traffic across the federal space with a metric to 
measure the likelihood of malice in near real-time will significantly enhance the 
cybersecurity posture of government and shorten the dwell time of malicious software. 
This thesis argues that the federal government should implement a cloud-based data 
reputation capability to protect all federal, state, local and private-sector partners. The 
service will complement the current cybersecurity initiatives being implemented across 
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government and raise the cost of cyberattacks by sharing information about malicious 
content in real-time. 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The commercial industry created an emerging field dedicated to reducing risks 
associated with depending on signature-based technologies for protection from viruses 
and malware. Referred to as “security intelligence,” this field of information security is 
quickly becoming a staple of effective cybersecurity programs. One specific element of 
this field posits that files and content sources can be tracked and monitored for 
trustworthiness by assigning them reputation scores. There are several examples of 
commercial data reputation services, each implemented slightly different with various 
strengths and weaknesses when viewed from the perspective of the federal government. 
Competition to increase capabilities and protections offered by today’s anti-virus (AV) 
and anti-malware (AM) products has resulted in sector leaders developing near-real time 
data reputation capabilities that claim to have the ability to protect hosts from newly 
discovered variants of malware prior to the development and deployment of signatures. 
These capabilities are based on the providers’ ability to collect data from events at their 
customers, thus creating a crowdsourced set of indicators that can be analyzed to form an 
assessment of risk to accompany items such as IP addresses, domain names, or malware 
hashes. This thesis will examine publicly available information from industry leaders to 
determine common elements of data reputations services. This information will inform a 
report and recommendation on the best approach for a federal government–wide data 
reputation service. The security intelligence elements of the following EPP products were 
chosen based on their rating as leaders in the 2016 Gartner Magic Quadrant for endpoint 
protection (Firstbrook & Ouellet, 2016): 
• Symantec DeepSight  
• McAfee Global Threat Intelligence Technology 
• Kaspersky Security Network 
• Trend Micro Smart Protection Network 
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• Sophos Live Protection 
The thesis will also review alternative data reputation models that do not include 
EPP software, specifically:  
• CISCO Advanced Malware Protection 
• Akamai Cloud Security Intelligence 
The structure for the remainder of this thesis is as follows: 
• Chapter II reviews existing data reputation solutions from industry leaders 
identified above 
• Chapter III identifies the most common and most beneficial elements of 
data reputation solutions in identifying and mitigating risks 
• Chapter IV proposes an effective data reputation solution to implement 
across the federal government and partners 
• Chapter V provides context with existing federal initiatives 
• Chapter VI concludes the thesis and suggests further research 
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II. COMMERCIAL DATA REPUTATION SOLUTIONS 
There are several data reputation services available today from commercial 
vendors. Most have added advanced cloud-based capabilities to AV and AM products in 
order to strengthen endpoint security and defense. Particularly, companies have added the 
ability for endpoints to reach out to the cloud, in real time, to determine if the specific 
communications pattern has been seen before, and if so, whether it is malicious or 
benign. There are several aspects of this capability that enhance the endpoint security 
posture. 
A. CHARACTERISTICS AND BENEFITS  
First, endpoint protection (EPP) software companies have struggled to keep AV 
and AM products relevant and valuable. When 44% of EPP software customers have 
suffered from breaches (Firstbrook & Ouellet, 2016), companies are questioning whether 
their investment into EPP solutions are providing an adequate return on investment. 
Driving the protection baseline up is the most important goal of the industry and security 
intelligence capabilities are a major part of the strategy. Second, sector leaders with vast 
deployments of EPP products have the ability to turn every instance of the deployed 
software into a standalone sensor able to provide a valuable stream of information 
regarding real time threats faced by the host. This is a microcosm of the vision for a self-
healing Internet, and a contributor to competitiveness for the EPP providers who fear 
being commoditized as they offer similar services all predicated upon a need to have 
already formed a signature to recognize incoming malicious traffic.  
Companies have developed sophisticated algorithms to inspect telemetric inputs 
from millions of deployed software agents which act as an Internet early warning system. 
This aggregation of information provides valuable intelligence and situational awareness 
of active threat actors, the location of the source and destination of active malicious 
attempts and the extent of an ongoing outbreak. As threats are unleased on the Internet, 
EPP software vendors are able to rely on information received from deployed sensors to 
detect these emerging threats. Mapping the outbreaks as the event progresses and spreads 
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from the source may provide an indication of the intention of the actor. Similarities 
among campaigns can also be determined earlier in the attack life cycle and result in 
quicker response times and improved security postures.   
Data reputation determinations are made based on proprietary algorithms 
developed by each software vendor that consider the culmination of many factors. Often, 
these algorithms are standard data mining algorithms that can be used in a variety of 
datasets and are now being applied to cyber security. They tend to be complex and 
applied in series, so it is nearly impossible to derive the origin of or reason for a specific 
reputation score given to a specific entity. Longstanding, reputable websites that 
consistently serve legitimate content are trusted sources of information and have a 
positive reputation score. Note that a “positive reputation score” for purposes of this 
thesis means low risk or a good reputation. Providers of reputation scores have a variety 
of scales, some of which rate the worst reputation, others the best. The field has grown 
from the ground up by the cyber service providers themselves inventing creative ways to 
use their client base as sources of cyber threat indicators to make their products more 
competitive. Malicious traffic detected by sandbox technology platforms and by teams 
performing forensic analysis identifies the source IP address and URL, along with other 
relevant details. This information is fed into the reputation algorithm and drives the 
scores for the identified entities into a negative range. Newly established domains with 
unknown purpose and little content delivery history are scored as such offering the ability 
to address this situation with caution.   
The accuracy and efficacy of any data reputation service is based largely on the 
effectiveness of the algorithms and the telemetry ingested from endpoints around the 
globe. A dedicated team of forensic analysts are also key to maintaining the integrity of 
the service. Each of the following EPP software vendors are industry leaders and have 
established robust data reputation services based upon telemetric data consumed from 
millions of endpoints. 
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B. SYMANTEC DEEPSIGHT 
Symantec’s data reputation service evolved from a capability called “Insight,” 
which consisted primarily of a database of all known executables encountered in the 
digital world (Symantec Corporation, 2012). Through their extensive worldwide network 
of deployed EPP products, Symantec established a database that stored the name and 
attributes of every executable file seen. Based on a proprietary method, Symantec 
evaluated numerous characteristics and attributes and rated each unique file with a trust 
level. Executables from known software manufacturers were trusted with a high level of 
confidence while newly discovered executables from unknown vendors were rated as 
suspicious. Malicious files identified through analysis are also maintained and shared for 
quicker protection against emerging cyber threats. Today, the product has evolved into a 
robust, comprehensive, full featured security intelligence service known as “DeepSight,” 
which tracks and maintains numerous attributes of various key indicators of cyber 
hygiene to determine a risk score for information (Symantec Corporation, 2015a). By 
establishing a global intelligence network comprised of more than 40 million sensors 
around the globe, Symantec can track malware, email, web traffic and botnet activity on a 
continual basis to assess threats posed by the observed information flow. Ownership, 
established or unknown reputation, and event information and correlation are key 
indicators used to establish a trust level for Internet domains and uniform resource 
locators (URL). Tracking malicious software in real-time is another important capability 
needed to swing the balance from attacker to defender. 
C. INTEL SECURITY (MCAFEE) GLOBAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE 
TECHNOLOGY 
At the time McAfee was acquired by Intel Security in 2011, they were already a 
leader in the data reputation arena. Artemis, Greek Goddess of the Hunt, was the program 
name originally chosen by McAfee to represent the company’s real-time, proactive 
defense model based on data reputation (Brenesal, 2008). In accordance with the most 
prevalent threats at the time, Artemis tracked suspicious executables and dynamic link 
libraries (DLL) active on endpoints running McAfee products. McAfee Avert labs 
continuously updated the cloud-based service with newly identified malware and 
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variations of existing malware, enabling endpoints to defend against emerging threats. In 
2008, McAfee Inc. acquired Secure Computing Corporation (Intel Security, 2015). 
Secure Computing specialized in network protection products, and had a reputation 
system for network traffic, specifically from their firewall, web gateway and mail 
gateway appliances that looked at widely different telemetry than the McAfee Avert Labs 
endpoint dataset. The combination of Artemis and the Secure Computing reputation 
system enabled McAfee to build a suite of security intelligence tools that all used an 
integrated approach to ingesting, sharing and operationalizing threat intelligence now 
known as the McAfee Global Threat Intelligence Technology product line (Intel Security, 
2016).  
McAfee Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) is the component specifically designed 
as a real-time, cloud-based reputation service that enables endpoints to dynamically 
defend against emerging attack vectors that manifest in files, web traffic, message traffic, 
and network traffic. Like the Symantec reputation service, McAfee relies on attributes of 
files, URLs, domains and IP addresses to provide reputation scores. McAfee combines 
information from several external sources as well, such as the Cyber Threat Alliance, to 
enhance the capability. Endpoints protected by McAfee VirusScan Enterprise are able to 
communicate in real time with the GTI cloud to determine if suspicious files and traffic 
have been seen before and, if so, obtain a reputation score. Organizations are able to set 
their risk tolerance level, according to the business need, to maintain an appropriate risk 
posture and proactively block malicious and suspicious events. Companies and 
organizations with a lower threshold for risk are able to increase their security posture by 
blocking unknown, suspicious and malicious files proactively. By only blocking known 
malicious files, companies are able to maintain an open, collaborative network at a lower 
security posture. This capability does not exist with most signature base AV and AM 
software. 
McAfee Inc. was acquired by Intel Corporation in 2011 and these capabilities 
now exist today under the Intel Security brand (Vance, 2010). This sequence of business-
driven events demonstrates the key role of corporate mergers and acquisitions and the 
general global business landscape on cyber security capabilities. 
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D. KASPERSKY SECURITY NETWORK 
The Kaspersky approach to data reputation provides core EPP capabilities. This 
cloud-based service collects information about suspicious files, executables, websites 
visited, email attachments and peer-to-peer downloads to determine which may pose a 
threat to their customers (Kaspersky Lab, 2015). Kaspersky labs analyzes the information 
collected to determine whether each file or site is safe or malicious. Malicious content is 
added to the “Urgent Detection System” database while signatures are developed and 
deployed to endpoints. Confirmed safe content is added to a whitelist that is also 
continually updated on the endpoints. One method used by Kaspersky to authenticate 
content is by validating the digital signature vendors are now using to sign code. The goal 
of KSN is to improve protections for endpoints during the time between malicious 
software birth and when Kaspersky can deploy a signature for the new threat. One benefit 
of the reputation database is achieved through Wisdom of the Crowd (WoC) technology 
where malware can be rated using the popularity reported across the Kaspersky 
community. Kaspersky also added global security ratings (GSR) which is a customizable 
algorithm of data reputation elements allowing each organization to create a custom risk 
tolerance. By combining whitelists, blacklists, signatures, WoC, and GSR, Kaspersky is 
able to offer a robust EPP product that minimizes the risks associated with new and 
evolving malware. 
E. TREND MICRO SMART PROTECTION NETWORK 
As a leader in the EPP market, Trend Micro is well positioned to lead cloud-based 
data reputation service offerings by commercial vendors. The smart protection network 
includes several elements that together provide a comprehensive protection strategy for 
Trend Micro customers (Trend Micro, 2012). According to Trend Micro, there are 
hundreds of millions of sensors around the globe providing telemetric data and analysis 
of over one hundred terabytes of files, web addresses, mobile apps, network addresses. 
This extensive network, along with a cadre of malware and cyber specialists, identifies 
and protects against over five hundred thousand new threats daily. Web traffic analysis 
involves collecting all URLs encountered across all Trend Micro endpoints. After 
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filtering known good and known malicious URLs, analysis begins on remaining 
suspicious addresses leveraging sandbox technology to identify malicious behaviors. 
Finally, highly qualified cybersecurity analysts determine whether any outstanding URLs 
should be deemed malicious and added to the known malicious list. Trend Micro 
endpoints generate over sixteen billion queries each day, resulting in over two hundred 
and fifty million blocks of malicious traffic and files. Trend Micro’s extensive 
capabilities are implemented using a cloud-based big data architecture based on the 
hadoop model. This distributed, unstructured approach to data allows Trend to ingest 
massive volumes of information. Sophisticated algorithms and big data visualization 
tools provide predictive intelligence and insight into the ever-changing threat landscape, 
proving why Trend Micro continues to be an industry leader in EPP. 
F. SOPHOS LIVE PROTECTION 
The Sophos EPP strategy depends upon a worldwide network of facilities called 
SophosLabs (Sophos Ltd., 2015). Using a “follow the sun” approach, the labs continually 
track and respond to emerging threats. Sophos maintains information on every IP address 
encountered along with IP classifications to create a reputation score and a protection 
policy. The score is based on several factors beyond whether an address was observed 
generating malicious traffic or spam messages, factors like whether or not the address is 
assigned to “end-users” are considered higher risk due to frequent infections affecting 
individual web users. Hostnames associated with suspicious or malicious IP addresses are 
also tracked and provided as a protection criteria. Sophos offers live protection as a part 
of their EPP product capability and as a network-based proxy appliance (Sophos Ltd., 
2014). This flexibility allows customers to balance endpoint performance demands with 
network performance demands while still maintaining a high level of security for the 
environment. 
G. ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
Other vendors have created cloud-based data reputation services outside of the 
agent-based EPP model. Companies with extensive global Internet presence, like Cisco, 
are leveraging those capabilities to create and enhance visibility of cyber threats, 
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malicious code and targeted attacks. Cisco’s published statistics indicate that they 
monitor 35% of worldwide email, one hundred terabytes of data and over one million 
malware samples every day (Cisco, 2015). Cisco’s visibility into global Internet traffic 
through their dominance in the network equipment sector allows them to understand what 
is happening in the wild, without the need to interact directly with servers, workstations, 
laptops or mobile devices. 
Akamai’s content delivery service places them in a unique position between 
consumers of content and the creators of content. Akamai delivers 15–30% of the world’s 
web traffic each day through more than 1,300 networks, and 175,000 servers in over 100 
countries (Akamai, 2015). Akamai’s direct visibility into terabytes of web traffic allows 
them to maintain a very accurate map of the Internet. By associating Internet addresses 
with traffic patterns, Akamai establishes and maintains a data reputation score for every 
known address. This information allows customers to refine security defenses by setting a 
threshold of risk based on the reputation score calculated by Akamai. Customers can 
choose to automatically block addresses that have been observed sending malicious 
traffic. The ability for organizations to strengthen perimeter defenses is key to a 
comprehensive cybersecurity strategy but only when measures are taken to eliminate 
rogue access points that subvert a trusted Internet connection. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE CLOUD-BASED DATA 
REPUTATION SERVICES 
Technology will continue to expand into every aspect of human existence at an 
exponential pace leaving security professionals chasing from behind trying to instill 
structure and safety. This expansion is often referred to loosely as the Internet of things. 
The field of security intelligence offers a unique opportunity to close the gap between 
observing malicious intent and building protective measures to address the event. 
Numerous commonalities exist between the security intelligence capabilities of the 
products and services discussed in Chapter II. By identifying the core capabilities among 
competitors, we can establish a baseline of required functions to inform a government-
wide security intelligence architecture. Several aspects of data reputation stand out when 
analyzing dominant industry solutions such as those identified in this work. Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs), Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, email attachments and files 
form the basis of most cloud-based reputation services. 
A. UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATORS 
URLs bridge the gap between machine speak and human speak, enabling non-
technical individuals to understand and incorporate technology into their everyday lives. 
URLs also abstract the physical location of a destination host from a logical 
representation, allowing customers to use a familiar address without worrying about 
where the service will originate from. This flexibility allows content providers to adjust 
services and capabilities on the back end while allowing customers to rely on the same, 
easy to remember, URL (Kunze, 1995). Hackers leverage this flexibility to their 
advantage by creating URLs in malicious code that can always find a server to receive 
nefarious instructions from. Hackers commonly use URLs instead of IP addresses 
because it allows adjustments to be made to the hacker’s infrastructure without affecting 
the malicious code already attached to host systems. 
For the Internet to effectively translate URLs to IP addresses, there must be a 
domain name service (DNS) record associated with every URL that is registered on the 
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Internet (Mockapetris, 1983). The distributed nature of DNS means that when the name 
resolution process occurs on a host in a different DNS name space, the lookup will iterate 
through each level of the DNS structure starting at a top level domain. From there the 
lookup will locate the name space of the requested URL and iterate down each level until 
the request reaches the authoritative DNS server that is hosting the record associated with 
the URL (Microsoft Corporation, 2005). In the case of a malicious actor, the DNS server 
may be under their control or a compromised server configured to do their bidding. 
Just as cyber criminals have discovered how to use the features of the Internet to 
their advantage, so too have security professionals. By tracking domain registrations and 
correlating URLs with telemetric data from sensors around the globe, security 
intelligence is able to quickly determine if a malicious actor is actively engaging in 
nefarious behaviors and adjust the reputation scores of URLs accordingly, thereby 
providing near real-time protection without delays associated with traditional signature 
creation and deployment. 
B. INTERNET PROTOCOL ADDRESSES 
Since the beginning of civilization, addresses have served as a cornerstone for 
moving goods and services. Cyberspace is no different. Each and every digital interaction 
occurring within a computer and without requires addresses. The Internet is built upon 
the continual disseminated implementation of the transport control protocol/Internet 
protocol (TCP/IP) which allows expansion of the Internet in a distributed fashion without 
the need of maintaining a master database of hosts and servers. This model allows the 
Internet to be extremely resilient because routing protocols are also dynamically built and 
maintained. Internet outages typically cause routing tables at the edge of the outage to 
simply update their routing tables and send packets along a different path to their 
destination (Gerich, 1993).  
Requests for services over the Internet typically result in a session being 
established between the requesting host and the servicing host. Persistent sessions are 
created using the source and destination IP addresses of the hosts involved in the 
interaction and the roles of source and destination flip flop depending on the direction of 
 19 
the packets (Kozierok, 2005). This means that hosts know who they are talking to, 
especially when secure protocols requiring an identity are used. They also know what 
information is being transmitted over the session. Visibility and protection from 
malicious transmissions over a TCP/IP session are key elements of any EPP product. 
Knowing the reputation of an IP address prior to establishing a session adds a valuable 
host protective capability that decreases risk. Maintaining a database of all available IP 
addresses and continually updating their reputation scores each time traffic to or from an 
address is observed accelerates protection against malicious activity by warning of 
danger so others can adjust. 
It is important to note that as the world and Internet migrate to Internet protocol 
version 6 (IPv6), databases holding IP addresses will need to be changed to reflect new 
addresses and, with some degree of difficulty, the infrastructure and capabilities may rely 
for the foreseeable future upon a mapping of IPv4 to their new IPv6 counterparts. This 
will affect telemetry solutions and studies that are based on IP addresses. 
C. EMAIL ATTACHMENTS 
Email has become an integral part of modern life and continues to replace 
traditional methods of sending and receiving correspondence. In 2015, the average 
number of emails sent surpassed two hundred billion per day (The Radicati Group, 2015). 
Combine that statistic with the fact that approximately one in 1,000 emails are phishing 
attempts (Symantec Corporation, 2015b) targeting individual’s personal, financial or 
corporate information and the scope of the problem is clear. Phishing is a long standing 
attack vector that continues to pay dividends as cybercriminals continually improve and 
refine their messages to increase the likelihood of success. Phishing messages are 
designed according to the objective of the sender. Organizations must protect against 
emails with generic themes likely to resonate with numerous employees, such as IT 
support messages or corporate broadcasts. Targeted “spear phishing” emails are also a 
major concern and much more difficult to detect due to the limited target audience. Spear 
phishing is a tactic typically used by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors with 
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specific objectives in mind, such as corporate espionage and intellectual property theft 
(FireEye Inc, 2014).  
By monitoring all email and attachments, cybersecurity defenders can build a 
database of attachment names, hashes and other relevant details of files which have been 
determined malicious through sandbox technology, signature-based detection and 
security analysis. Email servers receiving malicious email query the reputation database 
prior to delivery of the message to the recipient’s inbox. Since reputation scores 
continually evolve, it is also important that EPP products confirm the safety of 
attachments at the time the recipient opens the message. This model adds two layers to a 
defense in depth strategy and allows time for traditional signature based defenses to catch 
up. 
D. MALICIOUS FILES 
The field of AV and AM software emerged to confront a steady growing and 
evolving nuisance that, today, costs organizations and individuals billions of dollars 
annually (Ponemon Institute, 2015). Lost or corrupt information, system failures and 
increased maintenance are a few of the cost drivers resulting from malicious code. 
Creative individuals continue to find interesting ways to manipulate computer systems 
and their operators by inserting malicious logic and deceiving targeted individuals into 
executing the code. Once processed, the malicious code usually carries out the objectives 
of the hacker resulting in loss or damage to the victim. 
In today’s interconnected world, malicious files are constantly being delivered to 
potential victims through email, web browsing and file sharing services. Minimizing 
exposure to unknown files is a key element to protecting information systems, but 
eliminating the risk entirely is usually not an option. The inherit insecurity of software 
requires a constant flow of patches and hotfixes from every applicable software vendor. 
Therefore, tracking every known file encountered on the Internet along with establishing 
a reputation score increases the security posture for organizations benefitting from this 
capability. Known safe files from reputable software vendors are tracked and validated 
continually without impeding system operations. Known malicious files are also 
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identified and maintained allowing endpoints to immediately block files based on a 
negative reputation score. All newly discovered files from unknown or unverifiable 
sources fall into the suspicious category and are continually tracked in order to establish a 
risk rating. A key goal of the cybersecurity community, and one where reputation 
technology and the use of telemetry will help, is to shorten the time between first 
recognition of a malicious indicator to all Internet points having awareness and being 
able to detect and deflect the new threat. 
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IV. DATA REPUTATION ACROSS THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
The federal government is responsible for the protection of countless sensitive 
projects of all sorts and scopes. Next generation weapons systems, intelligence 
information, law enforcement information, personally identifiable information and 
protected health information are a few examples of the breadth of information maintained 
by the federal government. As a result of the Office of Management and Budget’s cyber 
sprints, many projects across several departments and agencies have now been 
categorized as high value assets, meaning there is a high probability that the systems are 
actively being targeted by cyber criminals and adversaries of the United States (Scott, 
2015). Since each information system could potentially have different threat actors using 
unique tactics to subvert the security of the system, it is necessary for any federal data 
reputation solution to be customizable and adaptable from a system perspective and a 
threat actor perspective. This capability will allow every department and agency to 
implement a customized risk posture that can be as strict or lenient as needed. Another 
key benefit of any data reputation solution is the number of sensors participating and 
providing telemetric data. The federal government has over four million employees and 
service members. It also spends over five hundred billion dollars on contract support 
although an exact number of contractors is not known. Establishing a total count of 
devices across the federal government capable of serving as a sensor providing telemetric 
data to a centralized threat monitoring service is a difficult task. The continuous 
diagnostic and mitigation (CDM) program is a federal wide initiative with a phase 1 goal 
of identifying every device active on every federal network. The CDM program, 
however, is not mature enough to provide this level of information yet. Having an 
extensive network of sensors providing real time information about what threats are 
actively targeting hosts across the federal government is a valuable source of intelligence. 
This information can be used at both a macro level to provide a mapping of active threats 
across the federal space and at a micro level specific to a particular department or agency 
to convey and inform the threat component of the risk equation. Knowing which specific 
 24 
exploits are actively being attempted by threat actors allows organizations to prioritize 
existing vulnerabilities and exposures in a cost effective manner. Organizations must 
understand the threats they face in order to evolve into a risk management model. 
A. ALTERNATIVES TO ACHIEVING A CLOUD-BASED DATA 
REPUTATION SERVICE ACROSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
There are several models the government could adopt to achieve a cloud-based 
data reputation service that encompassed the entirety of the federal government. Several 
levels of complexity and costs are primary factors to consider in weighing the options.   
1. Sole Source 
One alternative that would require the least amount of time but would most likely 
offer the least amount of flexibility would be for the federal government to adopt a 
singular commercially available option, like those described in this thesis. By leveraging 
the federal acquisitions process, the government could publish a succinct list of EPP 
requirements. Commercial vendors would then compete by offering valuable tools and 
services that satisfy the stated requirements. This strategy would allow the government to 
scrutinize each offer and select the proposal that provides the best value to the 
government. This approach would result in a uniform solution across the federal space 
that would lower complexity, simplify administration and establish predictable costs. 
These expected benefits would come at the cost of flexibility and customization due to 
the fact that every software vendor develops their products to accommodate a broad 
customer base with minimal concern for unique requirements that might exist. A sole 
source arrangement places the government requests for customization and enhancements 
at a level equal to other major customers of the product vendor. The government will 
need to ensure the requirements originally stated in the request for proposals fully address 
each circumstance reasonably expected over the life of the contract and that measures 
exist to address situations that might arise. The government will also need to develop a 
strategy that addresses cyber threats that are unique to the federal government, such as 
host nation actors engaging in espionage and theft of state secrets. This challenge 
becomes more difficult when viewed through a lens of diversity across the government. 
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For example, cyber actors targeting intellectual property housed by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) will most likely use completely different tools techniques and 
tactics than a hostile nation targeting a contractor facility in order to obtain an advanced 
weapons system design. The data reputation service acquired by the government will 
need to accommodate numerous unique scenarios that cross the spectrum of malicious 
cyber actors. 
The Department of Defense attempted to implement a sole-source model when it 
chose McAfee’s EPP suite as its product of choice. Led by the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), under the direction of the U.S. Strategic Command, the 
program is named the Host Based Security System (HBSS) and includes several custom-
configured EPP modules all centrally managed using McAfee’s ePolicy Orchestrator 
(EPO) product (Intel Security, 2012). DISA was able to clearly state important and 
unique requirements that DOD faces, which resulted in a unique build from McAfee that 
is capable of detecting and protecting against known tactics and techniques that were 
specific to DOD. Each command and unit was ordered to replace all EPP products 
running in their environments with the McAfee ePO solution. Administration and 
maintenance of the product line is also left to each organization. 
DOD faced many challenges throughout the implementation of HBSS, although 
the overall project is regarded as a success. First, many organizations were immature in 
their EPP strategy. Many simply implemented the required AV and assumed that was 
sufficient. Migrating from AV to a full suite of products, including intrusion prevention 
systems, host-based firewalls, application whitelisting and blacklisting and others 
represented a major move forward in technology that many organizations were not 
equipped to address. This situation caused training to be a major initiative in the success 
of the project. To address this challenge, DOD required training for all personnel 
implementing and administering the product. It even went so far as to require 
organizations to confirm that each HBSS administrator was trained by asking for their 
certificates of completion. 
Another challenge that threatened the HBSS project was the idea that since the 
requirement originated from the information security community, it should be left to the 
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security teams to address. Some organizations ended up with security teams architecting, 
implementing and maintaining HBSS for the enterprise, leaving the operations staff 
wondering why their privileged administrators could no longer solve issues. Having 
security teams run small projects that do not encompass all hosts across the enterprise 
may be an acceptable arrangement, but with HBSS being a comprehensive suite of EPP 
tools, this was problematic. System administrators who were used to having free reign to 
maintain servers, workstations and laptops, were suddenly handcuffed by the new 
security tools that they had no insight or knowledge of. This led to many wasted hours by 
administrative staff struggling to achieve basic tasks (like deploying a hotfix) due to the 
restrictive posture of the endpoint products. Frustrations between the operations staff and 
the security staff led some to believe that the best course of action was to abandon the 
project. Other organizations realized very quickly that having the security teams 
responsible for such a powerful toolset may satisfy security concerns, but might not 
maintain a healthy balance between security, functionality and cost. Organizations are 
required to achieve stability among all the pressures influencing goals and priorities in 
order to maximize effectiveness in accomplishing the mission. 
2. Develop a GOTS Solution 
Another alternative to achieve a cloud-based data reputation service across the 
federal government is to plan, architect, design, develop and implement a complete 
solution from ground up. This approach would allow maximum flexibility to develop a 
solution that would address the unique requirements of the federal government. 
Government could follow the lead of private industry and create a federated software 
package that would implement all the capabilities referenced in Chapter III. The 
government can develop a logical framework and a modular design allowing 
organizations to select elements to deploy. The design will also allow organizations to 
develop custom modules specific to their mission and threats that can plug in to the 
overall architecture, as well as allow other organizations to leverage existing code.   
This approach may seem like a logical choice but there are several challenges. 
First, the federal government has moved away from the days when computer 
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programmers were an integral part of the workforce. Today, the majority of programmers 
work in the private sector for software vendors and IT companies. Most programming 
tasks occurring for or on behalf of the federal government rely on private contractors. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) there were 130 software developers 
and programmers employed by the federal government in May of 2014, creating a 
challenge with taking on a major software development project involving the entire 
government enterprise (Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 2015). Hiring a private 
contracting company to accomplish a project of this magnitude requires thoughtful 
insight up front. Writing a statement of work for a complex endeavor without clear, 
complete requirements and goals introduces risk to completing the project on schedule 
and on budget. Poorly written requirements can lead to a project that spirals in circles 
without meaningful progress toward an ideal end state. On the other hand, properly 
captured goals and requirements allows the government to hire a well-qualified company 
with a background in developing similar solutions. Holding the vendor accountable and 
ensuring the government is receiving valuable services is also possible with a well 
written contract that clearly states the expectations of the vendor and the government.   
For a project of this scope and complexity, the requirements gathering phase 
alone will be a laborious task, if taken as a federal wide software development initiative. 
Asking each and every federal department, agency and bureau to clearly state their 
requirements for a cloud-based data reputation service would be hit or miss at best. In 
order to achieve an initial operating capability, the government should focus on 
establishing the requirements for the centralized cloud architecture, code specifications, 
integration requirements, along with a modular framework capability that is agnostic to 
specific technologies. Clear specifications will help to identify information, protocols and 
format for reporting information to the centralized database. This approach will allow 
organizations to develop modules based on their specific needs and infrastructure. 
Following today’s App model, the government can develop apps at various levels to 
allow organizations to integrate in a manner that works best for them and supports the 
overall goal of the program. For agencies with existing capabilities, apps can be 
leveraged to bridge host-based defense products to the government’s cloud-based data 
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reputation service. By intercepting and transmitting key elements of the data stream 
generated by host-based products, the government can take advantage of existing 
capabilities to achieve visibility across organizations and agencies. 
The design phase should focus on maximum flexibility and minimal information 
risk to increase the likelihood of adoption. Organizations need low cost, simple solutions 
that add value and are likely to work within existing environments. Many organizations 
are usually not interested in sharing information with external entities when there is the 
slightest possibility of damage to the agency. The damage can be in the form of a data 
breach, public perception or reputation. The design must consider how to minimize the 
amount of information collected and also how to anonymize what is collected. Any 
information considered sensitive must only be collected when absolutely necessary. 
Establishing the data reputation capabilities identified earlier requires very specific 
elements of Internet communications. The source of the communication is often an 
important characteristic in establishing the trustworthiness of data. The design phase must 
identify all the needed elements that must be collected. The design will also need to 
include risk algorithms that take inputs from all required sources needed to calculate a 
risk score. For example, newly registered domain names are higher risk than long 
standing, known domains. Ingesting domain registration information from domain 
registrars is a key element in determining the legitimacy of an Internet domain. For files 
and attachments, the system should be designed to ingest and track MD5 message digests 
instead of attempting to obtain a copy of every encountered file. This will minimize the 
collection of sensitive information such as PII. Files and attachments confirmed to be 
malicious should be collected in order to fully understand the objective of the malicious 
actors and establish the specific relationship to the targeted organization. The design 
should also include the ability to ingest and track IP addresses. Malicious activities 
should be attributed to the source IP address in order to establish an indicator of 
trustworthiness. To address the specific belief that information regarding current active 
threats targeting an organization is sensitive, the program should include measures to 
protect organizational attribution while also preserving the ability to understand where 
our enemies are focusing their efforts. These contradictory challenges require not only 
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technical controls around the data collected, but also administrative controls in the form 
of service level agreements, data sharing agreements or other instruments of negotiation. 
The design challenges are significant and must be fully addressed in order to increase the 
likelihood of success for the project. 
During the development phase of the project the team will need to operationalize 
the design in the most appropriate manner that accounts for all requirements while 
maximizing flexibility and value to an organization. Considering the federal cloud first 
initiative, the government should look to FEDRAMP approved cloud service providers 
first (Kundra, 2010). Cloud-based service providers who have obtained a FEDRAMP 
provisional authority to operate (ATO) are capable of providing dynamic, elastic services 
on-demand in a secure manner (FedRAMP Program Management Office, 2014). Next, 
the project should implement a standard three tiered architecture to optimize and protect 
the information stored within. The architecture should also include a code promotion and 
change management process to ensure organization and verification of the software 
development activities. An integrated collaborative environment with the capability to 
share code and practices should also be a cornerstone of the development processes. This 
will allow organizations to leverage existing progress in developing software and shorten 
the time to adopt the service. The development model should follow an agile 
methodology which focuses on iterative cycles, known as sprints, to produce the 
capabilities of the system. Traditional waterfall models do not allow for the flexibility 
required for this project. Agile also supports the modularity to enable organizations to 
work together in a synthesized manner where development activities on the server side 
can be synchronized with development activities at organizations integrating the 
endpoints. The empirical feedback loop required of the scrum processes should benefit 
lagging organizations as they leverage lessons learned from early adopters to streamline 
their implementation. A key capability required to achieve the intelligence of crowds 
benefit of this project is to ingest telemetric data from millions of endpoints. This means 
that the system must have the ability to execute billions of transactions daily. The events 
generated, transmitted and processed by the service must be highly optimized and 
encrypted to maximize the effectiveness of the program.  
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During the implementation phase, care must be taken to minimize any negative 
effects on participating organizations. By starting out with a pilot set of hosts, 
organizations can control and limit harm caused by any unforeseen technical glitches. 
Sending and receiving live information to and from endpoints adds a level of complexity 
that should be closely monitored to ensure an appropriate service level. As hosts are 
added to the service, the increased throughput might place a strain on the central service. 
This is where cloud elasticity comes in to offer dynamically expanded resources to meet 
the increases in performance demands. The core reputation database should be seeded 
with all known trusted sources of data reputation information gained through open and 
closed sources along with that gained through partnerships with private and public sector 
organizations. This will provide an immediate benefit to organizations rather than waiting 
for the service to develop an aggregated repository of data points over time. Eventually, 
the federal government data reputation service will evolve into a repository of threats 
active across the federal space.  
The operational phase will involve the continual upkeep of the service, expanding 
and calibrating threat information sources, tuning existing feeds from endpoints and all of 
the patching and administration required to maintain the service. Confidence in the 
reputation rating determined by the service is critical to the on-going success of the 
project. Therefore, continuous analysis and validation of reputation data is crucial to 
minimizing false positives and maximizing true positives. This requires a team of 
dedicated forensics analysts performing on-going analysis of artifacts deemed dangerous 
by the service. By continually performing quality control, the service will operate in an 
optimal manner maximizing value to participating organizations. Sophistication of 
reputation calculation algorithms can also be achieved through the analysis and findings 
of the forensics team. The service will also require a help desk to intake and manage 
issues identified by participants. Customer outreach is also an important aspect to 
success. 
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3. Hybrid Model 
Another approach the federal government can take to implement a cloud-based 
data reputation model is to combine the elements of a sole source acquisition with those 
of a GOTS software development initiative in order to maximize the benefits of each. By 
leveraging existing software solutions, the government can accelerate the process of 
reaching an initial operating capability (IOC) while working to customize the solution by 
adding threat information specific to the federal sector. A dedicated data reputation 
database can be obtained through the acquisition process if clearly stated as a requirement 
in the request for proposals. In this model, the role of the developers is more aligned with 
integrating the commercial software with a set of federal sector specific threat 
information feeds. This approach offers the best of both approaches with costs likely 
falling between a pure GOTS and pure COTS. Combining capabilities also introduces 
complexities regarding acquisitions, implementation, customization and support. The 
acquisition strategy will involve both acquiring a commercial software solution that 
meets the needs of the program and a software development and integration support 
contract to customize the software in accordance with federal sector threat protections. 
Another consideration to take into account is the fact that every EPP software vendor 
provides many more capabilities beyond data reputation services. Most commercial data 
reputation services are an extension to endpoint AV, AM, firewall and intrusion 
detection/prevention. Software call back functionality should be investigated and 
integrated into the dedicated cloud service whenever practical to avoid unnecessary 
disclosures to the vendor. Support for technical issues raised by participating 
organizations, developers and maintainers is also complicated under this approach due to 
the need to investigate matters prior to assigning the problem to the software vendor, the 
software developers, the integrators or maintainers for resolution. Establishing a unified 
helpdesk to support all issues and problems encountered is a key step to ensure the 
success of the project. Based on the analysis and tradeoffs between the options presented, 
the optimal strategy to achieve a cloud-based data reputation service that offers sector 
specific threat protection via a hybrid approach to acquire COTS software from a known, 
experienced software vendor along with the development and integration services 
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required. The government should conceive an ideal end state capability and capture all 
relevant requirements at the beginning of the acquisitions process. If adequately 
envisioned, the government can accelerate the timeline for implementation while working 
to integrate all source threat feeds. By combining the approaches and maximizing the 
benefits of each strategy, agencies and departments can reduce the time to detect known 
and emerging cyber threats. Combining the approaches also ensure organizations will 
have a suite of EPP capabilities covering signature-based requirements and 
supplementing with data reputation services, reducing the exposure between when 
malicious software is created and when organizations are protected. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, with responsibility for providing 
greater capabilities in cybersecurity to protect federal civilian government and private 
sector systems, coordinates incident response, CDM and perimeter protection. In the case 
of federal departments and agencies, this is to augment the security policies, processes 
and capabilities that the agency CIOs already instantiate. The role of government in this 
modern view is to leverage the most innovative approaches and datasets from the private 
sector and combine them with information and capabilities that are unique to government 
to create a holistic and comprehensive knowledge base to be shared with all.   This would 
indicate that the U.S. Government has been taking a hybrid approach and aggressively 
using its reputation system with combined private sector and government data, which has 
already been put into use in the EINSTIEN perimeter protection system for the federal 
civilian government (The Department of Homeland Security, 2015a). 
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V. RELATIONSHIP TO FEDERAL INITIATIVES 
As long as cyber criminals, hacktivist and host nation actors continue to harm 
individuals, corporations and government, cybersecurity will remain in the spotlight. 
Protecting a fundamentally flawed media, like cyberspace, requires a comprehensive 
approach that leverages all available resources in a coordinated and synthesized manner. 
Fostering the partnerships and integration sometimes requires synchronized legislation, 
regulations, policies and procedures. There are a few current examples of federal 
initiatives that support the implementation of a federal data reputation service. 
A. CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2015 mandates much more 
than information sharing. There are four sections to the law, each focused on major 
initiatives across the federal government and the private sector (Congress of the United 
States, 2015). The first section covers information sharing by and with the federal 
government and is the section where the law gets its name. The fact that information 
sharing is covered first indicates just how critical this element is to protecting federal 
information systems and the dependence of national security. The effectiveness of a 
federal data reputation service will rely heavily on the ability to quickly share security 
incident information regarding infections and compromises of IT systems. The broader 
the scope of threat information sources, the higher the value of the service. CISA compels 
the federal government to establish an information sharing capability to serve federal, 
state, local government and also the private sector, to include classified indicators of 
compromise (IOC). A cloud-based data reputation service could be a central part of an 
information sharing strategy. Protecting private entities from liabilities incurred by 
participating in information sharing is also a key element of this section. 
The second section of the law focuses specifically on initiatives to strengthen the 
security posture of federal networks. Mandates for establishing enhanced intrusion 
detection and prevention, along with mandatory agency participation are intended to 
strengthen the federal cyber security posture in a short time. Combined with the 
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aforementioned federal data reputation service, the intrusion detection and prevention 
system could be a valuable source of information related to malicious and benign hosts 
and attachments encountered on the Internet. By funneling all agency traffic through a 
centralize Internet connection and using the intelligence gained from aggregating the 
intrusion activity of each organization, a broad spectrum of risk will come into context. 
The value of this perimeter visibility is significant since the threat information is 
generated using network traffic that has not reached the endpoint. Using intelligence from 
intrusion detection and prevention tools, especially those with sandbox capabilities, is an 
important source in a federal data reputation service as it helps move threat detection 
closer to the source of the attack. 
CISA also requires that agencies determine which IT systems contain information 
that may be of interest to our adversaries. Agencies providing public services have IT 
systems that contain personal information, which is valuable to cybercriminals seeking 
financial gain. Host nation intelligence services have also successfully targeted 
information systems containing rich personal information covering government 
employees, contractors, families and friends in order to add content and context to the 
foreign service’s dossier on key U.S. Government personnel. Other information sources, 
such as the Food and Drug Administration’s extensive amount of intellectual property, 
are also highly valuable to cyber criminals and nation states. Maintaining a complete and 
accurate inventory of valuable data sources not only allows agencies to prioritize cyber 
activities, it will also serve as a priority grouping of IT systems that might warrant a 
higher security posture. The data reputation service can be configured to only allow 
known good attachments, URLs and information sources. Protecting these high value IT 
systems will involve blocking malicious communications with a negative reputation score 
and also suspicious communications that may not have a fully established reputation 
score.   
The information security continuous monitoring (ISCM) program has existed for 
well over a decade and focuses on the importance of monitoring the security posture of 
information systems on an ongoing basis as a way to make informed risk-based decisions. 
The current ISCM initiative intends to implement fundamental capabilities that provide 
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visibility into many aspects of information systems security management. Understanding 
what assets are connected to federal networks, knowing the software configuration and 
patching levels and proactively managing privileged users are all key goals of the current 
continuous diagnostic and mitigation (CDM) program. CISA adds advanced network 
security tool requirements to the current CDM program in order to improve visibility, 
detection and mitigation of intrusions and anomalous activities. A federal data reputation 
service fits this requirement by providing visibility across all participating organizations 
through telemetric aggregation and by mitigating threats seen on one part of the network 
across all other networks. 
Of critical note is that the information sharing that has been enabled due to this 
and other legislation is based on the premise that it is coordinated by the Department of 
Homeland Security in the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC), the cybersecurity watch operations center that manages all operations 
and incident response for cybersecurity. The NCCIC has implemented real-time machine-
to-machine sharing of cyber threat indicators, which are not personal information, but 
rather hints or signs of threats or those associated with a threat, such as an IP address or 
hash of a malicious file. Agencies worked together to ensure that privacy and civil 
liberties were the priority, so that in the necessity to collect a large amount of indicators 
to inform as many others as possible of a threat, this data collection and real-time 
distribution does not pose a threat to personal privacy. This is a core tenet at DHS and 
part of the reason that the NCCIC was chosen and certified as the center for this machine-
to-machine information sharing. This is the infrastructure and the way forward to create 
an ecosystem from the Internet where one intrusion or malicious attempt at one point is a 
learning moment for all other points on the network or greater Internet. 
B. CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (CSIP) 
Another major initiative set forth by the White House and the Office of 
Management and Budget is the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP). 
There are several similarities between CSIP and CISA since each was developed in 
parallel. Of the five CSIP objectives, three overlap with CISA. (Scott, 2015) Those focus 
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on identification of high value IT systems, workforce recruitment and retention and 
detection and response to malicious activity. Since the three overlapping objectives of 
CSIP and CISA relate to a federal cloud-based data reputation service in the same way, 
repeating the benefits is not necessary. The remaining objectives cover incident recovery 
and streamlined acquisitions of emerging technologies. The ability of agencies to rapidly 
recover from a cyber event is important to maintaining mission effectiveness. 
Implementing lessons learned from cyber incidents creates continuous improvement and 
maturity over time. Information sharing during the recovery phase, including indicators 
of compromise and lessons learned, will enhance a federal data reputation service. 
Incident details learned in responding to an incident affecting one organization can be 
used to help protect numerous other agencies. Information sharing will continue to be a 
critical component of modern cyber security programs helping to move from reactive to 
proactive defense and protection. The ability to identify and implement advanced tools 
and services to secure federal networks is also a challenge. With strict laws and 
regulations governing federal acquisitions, agencies find themselves frustrated and 
vulnerable. CSIP establishes specific tasks and deadlines to streamline acquisition 
challenges that delay acquiring emerging technologies. This objective will have positive 
affects across government and allow organizations to better protect themselves against 
emerging threats. Since cybersecurity is a cat and mouse game, being able to adjust 
quickly and efficiently can make the difference between an effective security posture and 
a major breach. Since any data reputation service will likely include acquiring products 
and services, streamlining and adding efficiencies to the acquisitions process will benefit 
the program. 
The focus on cybersecurity is now pervasive across public and private sector 
organizations. The steps taken by the legislative and executive branches of the federal 
government demonstrate how critical cybersecurity is to our national security. The steps 
also reinforce the importance of working together and sharing information. Collaboration 
is one action that we can take to address this sophisticated continual threat in a 
meaningful and comprehensive way.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Cyberspace has become the new frontier for humanity. Technology continues to 
expand into every aspect of daily life. The more integrated technology becomes, the more 
efficient and informed are the subjects. Technology not only informs but also tracks and 
learns. Aggregating habits, interests, physical movements and personal relationships of 
technology consumers has proven to be a lucrative approach to businesses in the cyber 
and physical worlds. Building a personal profile of likes and habits of every connected 
individual requires astounding amounts of data storage and processing. In 2013, SINTEF 
reported that 90% of all the data in the world had been created in the previous two years 
(Dragland, 3013). This trend continues today as companies, governments, criminals and 
activists find innovative ways to collect and mine vast quantities of personal information. 
Peter Sondergaard from Gartner Research claimed that information is the oil of the 21st 
century (Gartner, 2011). With such value placed on data and information, protecting 
against misuse is now a top priority for governments and companies alike. The future of 
the Internet must include self-healing hardware and software that recognizes malicious 
objects and immediately informs and deflects threats across every node. Data reputation 
services are a key capability on the roadmap that will shift the balance of cyberspace 
from an environment where attackers hold a dominant advantage, to one where 
organizations and agencies benefit from each and every malicious action occurring on the 
Internet.   
A. IMPACT 
This thesis proposed a model for implementing a federal-wide data reputation 
service to protect federal agencies by allowing them to make policy decisions based upon 
the observed and calculated risk. This capability reduces exposures agencies experience 
between the time a new or evolved threat is observed and when a signature is developed 
and deployed. The federal government should extend current initiatives using a hybrid 
model to maximize the benefits of private sector innovations with government strengths 
and resources. Several commercial software vendors have developed data reputation 
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capabilities, each implemented differently without a common interoperable specification. 
Data reputation service is a critical capability in reducing the threats faced by the federal 
government. The government’s ability to implement a federal wide data reputation 
solution will raise the security posture across all participating departments and agencies.   
B. FUTURE WORK 
Additional research and analysis is needed in several areas of data reputation. 
Establishing a standard interoperable specification for interchanging threat information 
will enhance reputation databases across all participating commercial and government 
entities. Having commercial EPP vendors add the ability to accept automated threat 
feeds, such as those implemented using the structured threat information expression 
(STIX) and trusted automated exchange of indicator information (TAXII) standards, will 
allow customers and vendors to benefit from information sharing regardless of the 
specific product. Enabling threat interchange at the end point will create a worldwide 
intelligence fabric able to report suspicious and malicious objects in near real time. This 
visibility will result in a fundamental shift in the protection of cyberspace. 
Data reputation algorithms are a critical factor in maximizing the effectiveness 
and confidence of a service that ingests information from numerous diverse threat 
sources. Expanding current algorithms to include government specific threat sources will 
ensure comprehensive coverage against actors targeting federal agencies. Progress in the 
data mining field should be evaluated to determine benefits to the data reputation field. 
 39 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Akamai. (2015, April 14). Akamai cloud security intelligence provides foundation for 
new advanced, data-driven cloud security services. Retrieved from Akamai: 
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/about/news/press/2015-press/akamai-cloud-
security-intelligence-provides-data-driven-cloud-security-services.jsp 
Barnett, J. (2010). Reputation: The foundation of effective threat protection. Retrieved 
from SCADAHacker.com:  https://scadahacker.com/library/Documents/
Threat_Intelligence/McAfee Reputation The Foundation of Effective Threat 
Protection.pdf 
Bonatti, P., Duma, C., Olmedilla, D., & Shahmehri, N. (2005). An integration of 
reputation-based and policy-based trust management. Retrieved from Rewerse: 
http://rewerse.net/publications/download/REWERSE-RP-2005-116.pdf 
Brenesal, B. (2008, November 19). McAfee total protection 2009 review. Retrieved from 
Computer Shopper: http://www.computershopper.com/software/reviews/mcafee-
total-protection-2009 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics. (2015, May). May 2015 national industry-specific 
occupational employment and wage estimates. Retrieved from U.S. Department 
of Labor: http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_999100.htm 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2015). 50 facts in 50 days. Retrieved 
from The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services: https://www.cms.gov/
Outreach-and-Education/Look-Up-Topics/50th-Anniversary/50-Facts-in-50-
Days-Pt1.pdf 
Cieply, M., & Barnes, B. (2014, December 30). Sony cyberattack, first a nuisance, 
swiftly grew into a firestorm. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/business/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-
swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html 
Cisco. (2015, November 3). Content security update. Retrieved from Cisco: 
http://www.cisco.com/assets/global/MK/events/2015/cisco_day/presentations/
Gyorgy_Acs-Content_Security_Update.pdf 
Congress of the United States. (2015, December). S.754 – Cybersecurity information 
sharing act. Retrieved from C: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
senate-bill/754 
Department of Homeland Security. (2015a). Einstein. Retrieved from Official website of 
the Department of Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/einstein 
 40 
Department of Homeland Security. (2015b). Continuous diagnostic and mitigation. 
Retrieved from Official website of the Department of Homeland Security: 
https://www.dhs.gov/cdm 
Donovan, S. (2015, October 30). Cybersecurity strategy and implementation plan (CSIP). 
Retrieved from The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf 
Dragland, A. (3013, May 22). Big data – For better or worse. Retrieved from SINTEF: 
http://www.sintef.no/en/latest-news/big-data--for-better-or-worse/ 
FedRAMP Program Management Office. (2014, June 6). Guide to understanding 
FedRAMP. Retrieved from FedRAMP: https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/
documents/ 
FireEye Inc. (2014). Spear phishing attacks – Why they are successful and how to stop 
them. Retrieved from FireEye: http://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/fireeye-
how-stop-spearphishing.pdf 
Firstbrook, P., & Ouellet, E. (2016, February 1). Magic quadrant for endpoint protection. 
Retrieved from Gartner: http://www.gartner.com/document/3196523 
Gartner. (2011, October 17). Gartner says worldwide enterprise IT spending to reach $2.7 
trillion in 2012. Retrieved from Gartner: http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/
1824919 
Gerich, E. (1993, May). Guidelines for management of IP address space. Retrieved from 
Internet Engineering Task Force: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1466 
Grover, R., Hosenball, M., & Finkle, J. (2014, December 3). Sony suffered the most 
devastating hack of a major U.S. company ever. Business Insider. Retrieved from 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-size-and-scope-of-the-sony-hack-is-
incredible-2014-12 
Goldstein, M., Perlroth, N., & Corkery, M. (2014, December 22). Neglected server 
provided entry for JPMorgan hackers. New York Times. Retrieved from  
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/entry-point-of-jpmorgan-data-breach-is-
identified/?_r=0 
Hardekopf, B. (2014, August 11). This week in credit card news: Hack costs Target $148 





Health and Human Services. (2015, February 2). HHS budget in brief – Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) overview. Retrieved from U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services: http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/
budget-in-brief/cms/ 
Intel Security. (2012, March 6). U.S. Department of Defense extends McAfee key role in 
largest IT security system deployment. Retrieved from Intel Security: 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2012/q1/20120306-02.aspx 
Intel Security. (2015). Secure Computing is now part of McAfee. Retrieved from 
McAfee: http://securecomputing.intelsecurity.com/ 
Intel Security. (2016, May 1). McAfee GTI reputation & categorization services. 
Retrieved from Intel Security: http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat-center/
technology/gti-reputation-technologies.aspx 
Kaspersky Lab. (2015, August). Kaspersky security network. Retrieved from Kaspersky 
Lab: http://www.kaspersky.com/images/KESB_Whitepaper_KSN_ENG_final.pdf 
Kozierok, C. (2005). TCP/IP guide a comprehensive illustrated Internet protocols 
reference. San Francisco: No Starch Press. 
Krebs, B. (2014a). FBI: North Korea to blame for Sony hack. Retrieved from 
KrebsOnSecurity: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/fbi-north-korea-to-blame-
for-sony-hack/ 
Krebs, B. (2014b). Target: Names, emails, phone numbers on up to 70 million customers 
stolen. Retrieved from KrebsOnSecurity: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/01/
target-names-emails-phone-numbers-on-up-to-70-million-customers-
stolen/#more-24297 
Kundra, V. (2010, December 9). 25 point implementation plan to reform federal 
information technology management. Retrieved from Federal CIO Council: 
https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/25-Point-Implementation-
Plan-to-Reform-Federal-IT.pdf 
Kunze, J. (1995, February). Functional recommendations for Internet resource locators. 
Retrieved from Internet Engineering Task Force: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1736 
MacMillan. (2016). Reputation. In MacMillan Dictionary. Retrieved from 
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/reputation 




Microsoft Corporation. (2005, January 21). How DNS query works. Retrieved from 
Microsoft Technet: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/
cc775637(v=ws.10).aspx 
Mockapetris, P. (1983, November). Domain names – Implementation and specification. 
Retrieved from Internet Engineering Task Force: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc883 
Nakashima, E. (2015, July 9). Hacks of OPM databases compromised 22.1 million 
people, federal authorities say. Washington Post. Retrieved from  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-
security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/ 
Ponemon Institute. (2015, October). 2015 cost of cyber crime study: Global. Retrieved 
from Ponemon Institute: http://www.ponemon.org 
The Radicati Group Inc. (2015, March). Email statistics report, 2015–2019. Retrieved 
from Radicati Group: http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Email-Statistics-Report-2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf 
Riley, M., & Robertson, J. (2015, July 29). China-tied hackers that hit U.S. said to breach 
United Airlines. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-07-29/china-tied-hackers-that-hit-u-s-said-to-breach-united-airlines 
Riley, M., & Walcott, J. (2015, June 5). China’s hack of U.S. data tied to health-care 
record thefts. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-06-05/u-s-government-data-breach-tied-to-theft-of-health-care-
records 
Scott, T. (2015, June 17). Fact sheet: Enhancing and strengthening the federal 
government’s cybersecurity. Retrieved from The White House: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/17/fact-sheet-enhancing-and-
strengthening-federal-government-s-cybersecurity 
Social Security Administration. (2007, September 27). Privacy impact assessment for the 
earnings record maintenance system. Retrieved from Social Security 
Administration: https://www.ssa.gov/foia/piadocuments/FY07/Earnings Record 
Maintenance System.updtd Sept 28.htm 
Sophos Ltd. (2014). Sophos cloud. Retrieved from Sophos: https://secure2.sophos.com/
en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/factsheets/sophos-cloud-dsna.pdf?la=en 
Sophos Ltd. (2015). Sophos data feeds. Retrieved from Sophos: https://www.sophos.com/
en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/partners/sophos-data-feeds-dsna.pdf?la=en 




Symantec Corporation. (2015a). Symantec cyber security services: Deepsight 
intelligence. Retrieved from Symantec Corporation: https://www.symantec.com/
content/dam/symantec/docs/white-papers/deepsight-intelligence-overview-en.pdf 
Symantec Corporation. (2015b). Symantec intelligence report. Retrieved from Symantec 
Corporation: https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/
other_resources/b-intelligence-report-01-2015-en-us.pdf 
Trend Micro. (2012). Smart protection network. Retrieved from Trend Micro: 
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/about/ds_smart-protection-
network.pdf 
Vance, A. (2010, August 19). With McAfee deal, Intel looks for edge. New York Times. 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 45 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
